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Abstract
Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the
repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no
strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally
stable strategies there is a stepping stone path out; there is always a neutral mutant
that can enter a population and create an actual selective advantage for a second
mutant. Such stepping stone paths out of equilibrium generally exist both in the
direction of more and in the direction of less cooperation.
While the central theorems show that such paths out of equilibrium exist, they
could still be rare compared to the size of the strategy space. Simulations however
suggest that they are not too rare to be found by a reasonable mutation process,
and that typical simulation paths take the population from equilibrium to equilibrium
through a series of indirect invasions.
Instability does not mean we cannot draw qualitative conclusions though. The
very nature of the indirect invasions implies that the population will on average be
(somewhat) reciprocal and (reasonably) cooperative.
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Everything changes, nothing remains the same
Buddha
1 Introduction: joy in repetition
Repeating a game generally opens up a variety of possibilities for equilibrium behaviour
that the one-shot version does not possess. Repeated games therefore have been studied
extensively; see for instance Friedman (1971), Aumann & Shapley (1976), Rubinstein (1979,
1980), Fudenberg & Maskin (1986), Abreu (1988) and van Damme (1989). The standard
example under study is the prisoners dilemma, where the Nash equilibrium in the one-shot
game is not Pareto-e¢ cient and where repetition o¤ers a possible escape from ine¢ ciency.
An interesting and natural follow up question is if evolution found an escape route too,
and if it did, if it is the same escape route as the one that game theorists found. Again
the literature is quite substantial, with for instance Axelrod (1984), Boyd & Lorberbaum
(1987), Farrell & Ware (1989), Fudenberg & Maskin (1990), Binmore & Samuelson (1992,
1997), Bendor & Swistak (1995, 1997, 1998), Lorberbaum, Bohning, Shastri & Sine (2002)
and Fudenberg, Imhof & Nowak (2005). The main problem these papers face is that in
general there is no evolutionarily stable strategy in repeated games, while evolutionary
stability is the main and usually also the most promising tool from the evolutionary game
theory toolbox (see Weibull, 1995).
This paper examines how unfortunate that is. Helped by the careful distinctions between
di¤erent denitions of stability from Bendor & Swistak (1995) and using arguments that
are similar (but not identical) to those in Selten & Hammerstein (1984) and Farrell & Ware
(1989) we begin with a general theorem concerning the non-existence of a nite mixture
of strategies that is evolutionarily stable in the classical denition (Maynard Smith &
Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1974). One way of dealing with such a negative result is
to try out less demanding equilibrium renements in order to overcome non-existence.
Although positive results have been achieved with this approach (see Bendor & Swistak
(1995, 1997, 1998) and, in slightly di¤erent settings, by Fudenberg & Maskin (1990) and
Binmore & Samuelson (1992, 1997)), we will argue that there is a fundamental instability
of all equilibria in interesting, non-trivial repeated games. We will do this by showing that
no equilibrium is robust against indirect invasions (Van Veelen, 2010). In other words, we
show that any equilibrium can be upset by an at rst harmless mutant, which serves as
a stepping stone, or a springboard, for the invasion of a second mutant. It is shown that
for repeated games such stepping stone paths out of equilibrium generally exist, both in
the direction of more and in the direction of less cooperation - that is, if a higher resp.
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lower level of cooperation is possible and, for increases in cooperation, if the probability of
breakdown is small enough. This indicates that there is no population state that, once it
is reached, cannot be overturned by a succession of mutants.
The proof of this central result is by construction of one such path out of equilibrium
with increasing cooperation and one with decreasing cooperation. We do however also
show that the whole, unrestricted strategy space for repeated games with discounting is
very large; it is uncountably innite. Therefore one could wonder whether the existence of
one or two stepping stone paths out of equilibrium really is a problem one should worry
about. We do however suspect that there are many similar ways out of equilibrium, and
in order to show that these stepping stone paths are indeed important for the dynamics,
we ran simulations. We nd that the population nds itself in equilibrium most of the
time, with regular transitions from equilibrium to equilibrium that do indeed follow these
stepping stone paths, both with rising and with declining levels of cooperation.
There are a few conclusions to be drawn from these ndings. The rst is that we should
be aware that for the repeated games we tend to look at when we study cooperation with
repeated interactions, instability is just as important to focus on as stability. That does
not imply that we can not say anything about what kind of strategies we can expect to nd
if we look at a repeated game being played in a population where strategies are subject to
mutation and selection. Quite the contrary; we will see below that even though nothing
is as stable as we would hope for, the transitions typically share some characteristics that
imply that on average - the average also being taken over time - we can expect strategies
to be somewhat nice as well as somewhat reciprocal. Exactly how nice and how reciprocal
we can expect strategies to be on average depends on the assumptions concerning mutation
probabilities. Along with the simulations we therefore developed measures for reciprocity
and cooperativeness of strategies.
As restrictions on the strategy space are just a special case of a choice for mutation
probabilities and a starting point, this embraces questions one could have about the devel-
opment of the literature too. The central theorem also implies that if a restricted strategy
space is used in the analysis of evolution of strategies in repeated games, and if we then
do nd an ESS, then one can always extend the strategy space so that this strategy is no
longer an ESS and in fact not even weakly robust against indirect invasions. So rather than
drawing conclusions from settings with a restricted strategy space, it is more important to
think of assumptions concerning mutation probabilities as essential.
2 No ESS
The literature concerning evolutionary stability and repeated games can at rst sight be
a bit confusing. The reason, as Bendor & Swistak (1995) show, is that di¤erent authors
have used di¤erent denitions of evolutionary stability. They also convincingly argue that
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Maynard Smiths (1974) denition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), and perhaps
a weaker version, that Maynard Smith (1982) calls a neutrally stable strategy (NSS), are
dynamically the most interesting and meaningful ones. We will therefore adopt the more
standard denition of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Here S is a space of pure strategies
for the repeated game and  : S  S ! R is the payo¤ function, where (S; T ) is the
payo¤ of a player playing strategy S against a player playing strategy T . The payo¤ of
the opponent T in this encounter is given by (T; S), thereby assuming that the game is
symmetric.
The pure strategy version of the denition - [2] in Bendor & Swistak (1995) - is as
follows.
Denition 1 (Pure ESS) A strategy S 2 S is evolutionarily stable if both
(S; S)  (T; S) for all T and
if (S; S) =  (T; S) then (S; T ) > (T; T ) for all T 6= S
As the standard denition of an ESS also allows for mixed strategies, we would like to do
the same here. We therefore equate mixed strategies with probability distributions over
the pure strategy space. Section 3 and Appendix A show how S can be endowed with a
metric to make it a separable metric space. Strategies P and Q will then be a probability
measures on (S;B) with Borel -eld B.
Denition 2 (Mixed ESS) A strategy P is evolutionarily stable if both
(P; P )  (Q;P ) for all Q and
if (P; P ) =  (Q;P ) then (P;Q) > (Q;Q) for all Q 6= P
Using Denition 1 - the pure strategy denition of an ESS - Selten & Hammerstein (1984) ar-
gue that every pure strategy in every non-trivial repeated game has neutral mutants (where
a trivial game would be one in which the stage game has a singleton strategy set). The
reason is that for every strategy S playing against itself, there is always an o¤-equilibrium
path. On the o¤-equilibrium path a strategy can be changed without consequences for pay-
o¤s. This creates a mutant strategy T for which (T; S) =  (S; S) =  (T; T ) =  (S; T )
and hence no strategy S can be ESS.
The following theorem states that nite mixtures of strategies can also not be evolution-
arily stable. Phrased in terms of Denition 2, we claim that no strategy P can be ESS if P
is a probability distribution that puts probability 1 on a nite number of strategies. The
proof is a simple generalization of Selten & Hammersteins argument; in a nite mixture
there is only a nite number of equilibrium paths and hence there is always an innite
number of o¤-equilibrium paths left on which behaviour can be changed without a¤ecting
payo¤s. Please note that Farrell & Ware (1989) make the same claim - and prove it - but
they use a di¤erent denition of evolutionary stability. Furthermore we will focus on games
with discounting, but the theorem below holds for undiscounted, innitely repeated games
too.
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Theorem 3 In a non-trivial repeated game there is no nite mixture of strategies that is
evolutionarily stable
Proof. Assume that P is a nite mixture of strategies. Let P1; :::; Pn denote the
composing pure strategies of P and let p1; :::; pn with
Pn
i=1 pi = 1 be the probabilities with
which they are played in P . It is safe to assume that P is a Nash equilibrium, as being ESS
implies being a Nash equilibrium.
There can be no more than n2 paths that are followed by combinations of two pure
strategies from this mixture. There is, however, a (countably) innite number of possible
paths; if k represents the number of possible actions of each player in the stage game,
then there are k2 possible action proles per repetition, and there is an innite number of
repetitions. (Note that a game is non-trivial if k > 1). For every nite mixture of strategies,
we can create a new strategy that performs exactly as well as the other strategies in the
mixture. Take one of the strategies present in the mixture, say strategy n, and mutate it
into strategy n+1 by only changing its behaviour for a history that does not occur along any
of the at most n2 paths followed by duos of strategies from this mixture interacting. Some
such changes could turn it into one of the other n  1 strategies, but there is a (countably)
innite number of possible histories to chose from (see also Section 3) and only a nite
number of strategies in the mixture, so there always exists one such mutant that really is a
new strategy. This new strategy does not cause any changes; when paired with any of the
n strategies both strategies n and n+ 1 follow the same paths and also the path of n with
itself is the same as n+ 1 with itself. Hence n+ 1 receives exactly the same payo¤ as the
other strategies from the mixture and we have a mutant that is not driven out. Therefore
the nite mixture is not evolutionarily stable.
One reaction to a non-existence result like this is to be less demanding. Bendor & Swistak
(1995, 1997, 1998) did this and chose to look at strategies that satisfy a weaker condition
- [3] in their paper. This condition equals Denition 1, but then with all inequalities
non-strict. They chose to name strategies that satisfy this relaxed condition evolutionarily
stable too, but clarity might be served with following Maynard Smith (1982) and Weibull
(1995) in terming such strategies neutrally stable (NSS). In the current paper, the denition
also includes mixed strategies, as opposed to Bendor & Swistak (1995, 1997, 1998)
Denition 4 (Mixed NSS) A strategy P is neutrally stable if both
(P; P )  (Q;P ) for all Q and
if (P; P ) =  (Q;P ) then (P;Q)  (Q;Q)
While there is no ESS, Bendor & Swistak (1995, 1997, 1998) do nd a profusion of (pure)
NSSes. They also nd that nice and retaliatory strategies have larger basins of non-
repulsion.1
1 In a nite automata setting with complexity costs and lexicographic preferences Binmore & Samuelson
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3 Stepping stones in either direction
A question one could ask is how much is lost if the demands are lowered from evolutionary
to neutral stability. After all, the fact that there is no ESS does by itself not make neutral
stability a more stable concept. It therefore seems worth trying to nd out exactly how
stable or unstable those NSSes in the repeated prisoners dilemma are. As the only di¤erence
between the denitions of an ESS and an NSS is that the latter allows for invasions by
neutral mutants, the question then becomes how much harm these neutral mutants can do.
If we think for example of the strategy Tit-for-tat, then it is clear that cooperations
worst enemy is not AllD, but a succession of rst AllC and then AllD. Tit-for-tat can easily
resist an invasion of AllD, but not of AllC, which is a neutral mutant of Tit-for-tat. If
AllC attains a high enough share of the population by random drift, then AllD gets a strict
advantage and can invade the population (see Fig. 1).
In Van Veelen (2010) the concept of robustness against indirect invasions is introduced.
For a strategy to be robust against indirect invasions (RAII) it must not only be a NSS,
but there must also not be a sequence of neutral mutants that opens the door for each
other, one after another, until some mutant strategy has an actual selective advantage.
The example above shows that Tit-for-tat is not RAII. Below we will see that it is not
just Tit-for-tat, but that there is in fact no strategy in a non-trivial repeated game that is
RAII; the proofs of the theorems below construct ways to leave any equilibrium in only two
steps, both in the direction of higher and in the direction of lower levels of cooperation (if
higher resp. lower levels are possible). More precisely, Theorem 5 shows that any positive
level of cooperation can be undermined by a succession of two mutations, while Theorem
6 states that if there are possible gains from (increased) cooperation, and the probability
of continuation is su¢ ciently high, then also a stepping stone route into more cooperation
exists. Together they imply that no equilibrium in interesting repeated games with low
enough probability of breakdown is RAII, and mostly there are ways out of equilibrium in
the direction of in- as well as in the direction of decreasing cooperation. Both theorems
come in a pure strategy version for expositional clarity and connection to the literature (5
and 6) and a mixed strategy version for generality (8 and 9).
We start with a few formal denitions. Consider a symmetric one-shot 2-player game g
characterized by a set of players I = f1; 2g, an action space A, equal for both players, and
a payo¤ function  : AA! R2. Using a discount factor , interpreted as a continuation
probability, this one-shot game is turned into a repeated one, which will be called   (). A
history at time t is a list of the actions played up to and including time t   1, where an
empty pair of brackets is used to denote the history no history. If at;i is the action played
by player i at time t, then these histories are:
(1992, 1997) relax the requirement of an ESS to a MESS (see also Swinkels & Samuelson (2003) for a
perfectly accurate and meaningful characterization of the di¤erent denitions). Their results are also in
favour of e¢ ciency.
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h1 = ()
ht = ((a1;1; a1;2) ; :::; (at 1;1; at 1;2)) ; t = 2; 3; :::
Sometimes we will also write (ht; (at;1; at;2)) for a history ht+1. The set of possible histories
at time t is:
H1 = fh1g
Ht =
Qt 1
i=1 (AA) t = 2; 3; :::
and the set of all possible histories is:
H =
1S
t=1
Ht.
It will furthermore be useful to have a way of writing down a history with the roles of the
players reversed. Given a history ht as they are dened above, its mirror image h t is found
by simply renumbering the players:
h 1 = ()
h t = ((a1;2; a1;1) ; :::; (at 1;2; at 1;1)) ; t = 2; 3; :::
The reason why histories with roles reversed are needed, is that we assume that both players
label themselves as player 1 and the other as player 2 and therefore face mirrored histories
as they go along.
A strategy is a function that maps histories to the action space; S : H ! A. For two
strategies, say S and T , the course of actions is determined by recursion; all actions at all
stages are determined by the initiation
hS;T1 = ()
and the recursion step
aS;Tt =

S

hS;Tt

; T

hS;T t

hS;Tt+1 =

ht; a
S;T
t

; t = 1; 2; :::
The discounted normalised payo¤s to (a player that uses) strategy S against strategy T is
given by:
(S; T ) = (1  )
1P
t=1
t 11

aS;Tt

With these denitions, we can prove the rst theorem. Note that strategies here are pure,
and that we write that S is an equilibrium strategy, which is short for (S; S) being a
symmetric equilibrium of the game   ().
7
Theorem 5 Let S be a strategy in the game   () and let there be a time  at which aS;S is
not an equilibrium of the stage game. Then S is not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Proof. Assume that S is an equilibrium (if it is not, it it trivially not robust against
indirect invasions). Let T be the strategy that equals S for all histories, except for those
that are elements of the set bH = ht j t > ; a;2 = argmaxa2A 2  S  hS;S  ; a	. These
histories only occur o¤ the equilibrium path, since it is assumed that players playing S
against each other do not play an equilibrium of the stage game at time  . For those histories
ht 2 bH we take T (ht) = S hS;St . Obviously, the paths of T against S, T against T , S
against S and S against T are all the same; hT;St = h
T;T
t = h
S;S
t = h
S;T
t 8 t. Consequently
the corresponding payo¤s are also equal; (T; S) =  (S; S) =  (T; T ) =  (S; T ).
Now let U be the strategy that equals S, except for hS;S , for which we take U
 
hS;S

=
argmaxa2A 1
 
a; S
 
hS;S

and except for histories that are elements of the set eH =
ht j t > ; a;1 = argmaxa2A 1
 
a; S
 
hS;S
	
, for which we take U (ht) = S

hS;St

; ht 2eH.
It is obvious that (U; S)  (S; S), for S is an equilibrium, and it is also clear that
(U; T ) > (T; T ) =  (S; T ), because U improves itself at time  without being punished
by T . As (U; T ) > (T; T ), while (S; S) =  (T; S) and (S; T ) =  (T; T ), S is not
weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Note that (U; T ) > (T; T ) =  (S; S)  (U; S), and therefore that T 6= S. In other
words, if T = S, then U does strictly better against S than S itself and that contradicts S
being an equilibrium.
What this theorem indicates is that as soon as there are equilibrium actions that must
be upheld by the threat of punishment, then there can be mutants that do not punish,
and subsequently there can be other mutants that takes advantage of the rst mutant
not punishing. One thing worth noting is that the proof constructs only one way out of
equilibrium. While this particular stepping stone path changes behaviour for histories that
are elements of rather moderate sets bH and eH, other ways out of equilibrium may come
with changes on larger, and maybe even more natural sets of histories, as for instance the
example in Figure 1 shows. But what the theorem shows is that if there is cooperation in
equilibrium, at least the existence of an indirect way out is guaranteed.
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Figure 1. An example of an indirect invasion with decreasing
cooperation; TFT, AllC and AllD. The dynamics are
computed for  = 34 .
While the reference point in Theorem 5 is the equilibrium of the one-shot game, we will now
focus on departures from what in non-trivial games is the other extreme: the maximally
feasible symmetric payo¤s. Therefore we dene max = maxa2A 1 (a; a) and amax =
argmaxa2A 1 (a; a). Note that amax is an action, while aS;S =
 
S
 
hS;S

; S
 
hS;S

is an
action prole. The following theorem states that if there is a point in the course of play
of an equilibrium strategy at which unilaterally initiating cooperation could be o¤set by
future gains from (increased) cooperation, then the strategy is not robust against indirect
invasions.
Theorem 6 Let S be a strategy in the game   () and let there be a time  , for which the
following holds:
1. 1
 
aS;S
  1  amax; S  hS;S  < 1P
t=+1
t 

max   1

aS;St

.
2. amax 6= S
 
hS;S

Then S is not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Proof. Assume that S is an equilibrium (if it is not, it it trivially not robust against
indirect invasions). Let T be the strategy that equals S for all histories, except for those
that are elements of the set bH = fht j t > ; au;2 = amax; u  g. These histories only
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occur o¤ the equilibrium path, as it is assumed that amax 6= S
 
hS;S

. For those histories
ht 2 bH we take T (ht) = amax. Obviously, the paths of T against S, T against T , S against
S and S against T are all the same; hT;St = h
T;T
t = h
S;S
t = h
S;T
t 8 t. Consequently the
corresponding payo¤s are also equal; (T; S) =  (S; S) =  (T; T ) =  (S; T ).
Now let U be the strategy that equals S, except for the history hS;S , for which we
choose U
 
hS;S

= amax and except for the histories that are elements of the set eH =
fht j t > ; a;1 = amax and au;2 = amax; u > g, for which we take U (ht) = amax; ht 2 eH.
It is obvious that (U; S)  (S; S), for S is an equilibrium, and it is also clear that
(U; T ) > (T; T ) =  (S; T ), because that follows directly from the rst requirement of
the theorem. As (U; T ) > (T; T ), while (S; S) =  (T; S) and (S; T ) =  (T; T ), S
is not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
As in the proof of Theorem 5, S being an equilibrium implies that T 6= S.
The requirements in this theorem are slightly less simple to check for than those in Theorem
5, but when translated to prisoners dilemmas, it turns out to imply something that is
relatively easy to handle. Before doing so, however, it is good to realize that discounted,
normalised payo¤s that belong to a combination of two strategies can vary with  and that
they do so in di¤erent ways. If we look at symmetric equilibria, then it might be that two
di¤erent strategies that, when played against themselves, both have the same discounted,
normalised payo¤ for a given , while a higher  increases them for one and decreases them
for the other strategy.
The next theorem states that for repeated prisoners dilemmas, all symmetric equilibria
with payo¤s less than 1 (C;C)   (1  ) [1 (C;C)  1 (C;D)] are not robust against
indirect invasions. If we take more or less standard values, that is 1 (D;C) = 4; 1 (C;C) =
3; 1 (D;D) = 1; 1 (C;D) = 0, then this amounts to 3; all strategies S with with payo¤s
(S; S) less then 3 are indirectly invadable. There may be many other equilibria that are
also not robust against indirect invasions, but Theorem 7 shows that at least all strategies
with relatively low payo¤s satisfy the criteria for Theorem 6. It also means that the closer
 gets to 1, the more strategies are shown to be vulnerable to indirect invasions with
increasing cooperation, and for any strategy S with payo¤ (S; S) < 1 (C;C) there is
a  2 (0; 1) such that S indirectly invadable for all  2  ; 1. Together with Theorem 5
that implies that for su¢ ciently high  no symmetric equilibrium strategy is robust against
indirect invasions.
Theorem 7 In a repeated prisoners dilemma, all strategies S with (S; S) < 1 (C;C) 
(1  ) [1 (C;C)  1 (C;D)] are not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Proof. First realize that S is 1 (C;C) (S; S) short from full, symmetric e¢ ciency.
Then choose as time  in Theorem 6 the rst period that S plays defect. The second
requirement of the same theorem is then automatically fullled.
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The following can then be derived
(S; S) < 1 (C;C)  (1  ) (1 (C;C)  1 (C;D)))
(S; S) < 1 (C;C)  (1  )  (1 (C;C)  1 (C;D)),
1 (D;D)  1 (C;D) < 1(1 ) [1 (C;C) (S; S)]  [1 (C;C)  1 (D;D)],
1
 
aS;S
  1 amax; S hS;S 1 < 1P
t=
t 

max   1

aS;St

   max   1  aS;S 
This satises the rst requirement of Theorem 6.
Again, the proof of Theorem 6 only gives one stepping stone route out of equilibrium, but
there may be lots of ways in which successive mutants can throw an equilibrium o¤ balance
with an increasing level of cooperation.
Figure 2. An example of an indirect invasion with increasing
cooperation; AllD, Suspicious TitForTat (STFT, also known
as TatForTit) and Cooperate-TitForTat (CTFT, cooperates
on the rst two moves and then imitates the opponent). The
dynamics are computed for  = 34 .
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3.1 Mixed strategies
In evolutionary as well as in standard game theory, equilibrium concepts usually allow for
mixed strategies. While the standard setting of symmetric 2-person bi-matrix games (see
Weibull, 1995) naturally comes with denitions in terms of mixed strategies, the literature
on repeated games is much more focussed on pure equilibria (with exceptions such as
for instance Binmore & Samuelson, 1992, and Samuelson & Swinkels, 2003). It seems
however no less natural to include mixed strategies here too, especially since the paths out
of equilibrium at least at rst lead away from pure strategies (or homogeneous populations)
and into mixtures of strategies. While Theorem 3 shows that there is also no mixed ESS,
Theorems 5 and 6 do not yet exclude the possibility that there is a mixture of strategies
that is RAII. In this subsection we therefore give the equivalents of those theorems for nite
mixtures. Here we will directly focus on repeated prisoners dilemmas rather than repeated
games in general. This will keep notation simpler, it hopefully helps the intuition and still
captures the essentials. Also, (D;D) will be used to denote (1  )P1t=0 t 11 (D;D) =
1 (D;D), which is the normalised discounted payo¤ of AllD against AllD.
Theorem 8
Let P be a nite mixture of strategies in   ().
If (P; P ) > (D;D) then P is not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Proof. See Appendix B.1
As with the pure strategy version, the proof in the appendix just constructs one particular
way out of equilibrium, while there may be many other stepping stone paths, some of which
can be considered to be more likely than others. But the theorem shows that indirect
invasions are always possible for equilibria with cooperation.
In order to formulate the mixed strategy counterpart for increasing cooperation, it will
be helpful to dene the following. Let P1; :::; Pn 2 S be the composing pure strategies of P
and let p1; :::; pn, with
Pn
i=1 pi = 1, be the probabilities with which they are played in P .
For any defection that occurs along a path of interaction between any two strategies Pi and
Pj from P we can discount the possible gains in the future and compare it to the current
period loss of switching from D to C as an initiation of cooperation. Therefore we rst
dene Ei (j)t =
n
Pl j hPi;Plt = hPi;Pjt
o
, which makes it the set of strategies against which
the history of Pi at time t is the same as against Pj . Since we assume that P is a nite
mixture, we know that limt!1Ei (j)t = Ei (j), where Ei (j) is dened (see also the proof
of Theorem 8) as Ei (j) =
n
Pl j aPi;Plt = aPi;Pjt 8 t
o
. For any combination of strategies
(Pi; Pj) and any time t we can compute ij;t as follows:
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ij;t =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 such thatP
Pl2Ei(j)t
pl

1

aPi;Plt

  1

C; aPi;Plt;2

=
P
Pl2Ei(j)t
pl
1P
u=t+1
u t
 
1 (C;C)  1
 
aPi;Plu

if aPi;Pjt;1 = D and the equation has a solution  2 (0; 1)
1 otherwise
This denition greatly simplies the formulation of the next theorem. Note that the condi-
tion is very modest; the continuation probability  only has to be larger than the smallest
ij;t.
Theorem 9
Let P be a nite mixture of strategies in   ().
If mini;j;t ij;t <  < 1 then P is not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
4 Indirect invasions in the simulations.
In Section 3 it was already mentioned that the proofs only provide two stepping stones paths
out of equilibrium; one with increasing and one with decreasing cooperation. This is enough
to show that an equilibrium is not RAII. Still, since there is an uncountably innite number
of strategies (see Appendix A), one could say that the existence of only one or two stepping
stone paths out would not necessarily make an equilibrium very unstable. We do however
know that the paths constructed in the proofs are not the only paths out and we conjecture
that in fact there will be very many quite similar ways out of equilibrium. Unfortunately,
with an uncountably innite strategy space, there is no way to determine how many paths
out would be enough to be able to say with some condence that a mutation process will
actually nd them. More precisely, even if the number of paths out of equilibrium would
also be uncountably innite for every equilibrium, a specic mutation process could still
imply that when the population is at an equilibrium, the mutations needed for an indirect
invasion occur with probability 0, while on the other hand, even when there would be only
one path out of each equilibrium, a specic mutation process could imply that it occurs
with positive probability. What matters therefore is the combination of a mutation process
and the possible indirect invasions. In order to be able to say if these indirect invasions
indeed drive the evolutionary dynamics in relevant, interesting settings, we will therefore
have to combine the game with a priori reasonable mutation processes. For our simulation
approach we simply started out with what we think is the most natural choice for a set of
mutation processes, if we do not want to exclude any part of the strategy space.
13
4.1 The simulations
The basics of the simulation are quite simple. There are N individuals and every generation
they are randomly matched in pairs to play the repeated game. Because the game has a
probability of breakdown that is smaller than 1, the number of repetitions is a random vari-
able. This, and the randomness of the matching, creates noise in the payo¤s of individuals.
These payo¤s are used in the update step. In the simulations reported here we use the
Wright-Fisher process. In the Wright-Fisher process all individuals in the new generation
are drawn one by one, and independently, from a distribution where the probability of be-
ing the o¤spring of individual j from the old generation is proportional to the payo¤ of j.
(The program also has the option to run it as a Moran process, but that is computationally
very ine¢ cient. The online material at www.creedexperiment/evolution contains a more
detailed description). After the new generation has been drawn, all individuals mutate with
a small probability. This completes the cycle for one generation. The cycle is repeated a
large number of times.
Strategies are programmed explicitly as nite automata.2 A strategy is a list of states,
and for every state it prescribes what the automaton plays when in that state, to which
state it goes if the opponent plays cooperate, and to which state it goes if the opponent
plays defect. There are four types of mutations we allow for: mutations that add a state,
mutations that delete a state, mutations that change the output when in a state, and
mutations that change for a given state to which state this player goes given an action of
the opponent. We chose mutation schemes where all of those four types of mutations are
possible. If that is the case, then there are two things that are worth realizing. The rst
is that every nite automaton can be reached by a nite sequence of mutations from any
other automaton. The other is that if we choose a very natural distance, then the set of all
nite automata is dense in the set of all strategies (see Appendix A). Together, this implies
that we can get arbitrarily close to any strategy through a nite sequence of mutations.
This we think is a very attractive property of a mutation scheme.
These ingredients are all there is to the simulation program itself. Still this simple
setup gives us a dynamic process with a few quite interesting features. As we will see
below, this evolutionary process always nds a stepping stone path out of equilibrium in
reasonable time. In fact, with increasing population size, indirect invasions come to domi-
nate everything else as a driver of the dynamic process. That however does not mean that
the notion of an equilibrium is not important; after leaving an equilibrium, the dynamics
2The program also has the options to represent strategies with regular expressions, or to let Turing
machines evolve. The set of regular expressions is equivalent to the set of nite automata, but because
they are represented di¤erently, the likelihoods of mutations also are di¤erent; a mutation that is a single
step in one representation requires a series of steps in the other and vice versa. This is discussed in more
detail at the website that also has the simulation program on it. The set of Turing machines is a richer set
of strategies that embraces the set of nite automata.
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tend to take the population to a new equilibrium relatively fast. The population settles in
the new equilibrium for a while, until another indirect invasion occurs. Under a reasonable
set of mutation schemes, populations of a reasonable size therefore appear to walk from
equilibrium to equilibrium through indirect invasions (see also Figure 3).
One feature that we nd particularly appealing in these simulations, is that they nicely
walk through a large strategy space in a way that shares quite some features with how we
think of actual evolutionary processes. While there is typically only a few strategies present
at any point in time, the process nonetheless takes the populations through many di¤erent
parts of a vast strategy space. This means that locally we can very well describe what
happens in the simulations with dynamics on simplices of relatively low dimensions. New
mutations however allow the process as a whole to go from one simplex of low dimension to
another, typically through shared facets. What is also realistic, is that mutations have to
work with what is there; the probability of a certain mutant entering the population depends
on how similar the mutant is to what is there at the moment in the current population.
This matches with how we think many evolutionary processes take populations through
what typically is a vast space of possibilities. Even though mutations are local - in the
sense that they only alter existing strategies - the dynamics of the process as a whole can
be quite rich, with a population that, although mostly in or close to equilibrium, still makes
its way through a rich strategy space.
Figure 3. Part of a typical run. The population size is 128, the continuation probability is 0.75. Blue letters
indicate where relevant neutral mutants occur, green letters indicate advantageous mutants entering. It
moves from a fully defective equilibrium to a fully cooperative one, back to a fully defective one, and then
to an equilibrium with partial cooperation. The actual sequence of strategies is given in Appendix D.
4.2 Capturing transitions
The aim of the simulations is to nd out if the possibility of indirect invasions indeed makes
a substantial di¤erence for evolutionary dynamics in repeated games. Before being able to
say if an equilibrium was left through an indirect invasion, it is important to rst be able
to say if it was left at all. While transitions are made possible by a mutation process that
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constantly produces new strategies, that very same production of new strategies also creates
noise in the population. This implies that if we think for instance of a pure equilibrium,
we should not only classify a population as being at that equilibrium if the population
consists of that one strategy only and nothing else. Given the frequent introduction of
mutants, most of which enter only to be eliminated from the population before ever having
attained a considerable share, we should also classify nearby population states as being at
that equilibrium, and create a bandwidth which allows us to disregard the noise.
If the population at time t consists of strategy A only, and at time t+100 of strategy B
only, then it is fair to say that at least one transition has occurred. If on the other hand the
population at time t, and at time t+ 100, and at all times in between, consists of between
90 and 100% strategy A and a remainder that is composed of an ever changing set of other
strategies, then it seems reasonable to assume that a transition has not occurred, and that
the little di¤erences only reect the regular inux and extinction of new mutations.
Figure 4. With only three strategies present, this depicts the
classication of population states with a threshold of 90%. A
population that consists, for example, of 65% strategy A, 30%
strategy B and 5% strategy C is classied as a 2 dimensional
mixture of A (most popular) and B (second most popular).
With four strategies, we get a three dimensional simplex with
a smaller simplex-shaped area in the middle that represents
the dark zone.
We therefore begin the classication of a population state by ranking the composing strate-
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gies from frequent to infrequent. Then we look at the minimum number of strategies that
is needed to capture at least a xed percentage of the population (below we choose 90%
for the threshold). A population state is then characterized by its dimensionality (pure, 2
strategies, 3 strategies, more than 3 strategies) and the actual most popular strategy, resp.
the 2 most popular and the 3 most popular strategies as they are ranked (see Fig. 4). The
classication thereby never ignores more than 10% of the population. With the mutation
rates and population sizes we chose in the simulations below, a population where the three
most popular strategies made up less than 90% of the population was a rare exception.
This classication allows us, at least to some extent, to pick up three types of (possible)
equilibria ; pure ones, mixed ones with two strategies, and mixed ones with three strategies.
If the population is at a pure equilibrium, we expect that it nds itself in a corner pocket
(see Fig. 4), and that most of the mutants do not take the population outside this corner
pocket. If a population is a mixed equilibrium with two strategies, it should nd itself
somewhere in between two edges, on the facet of the simplex. The construction of the
pocket excludes that the areas that are meant to capture the mixed equilibria consist of the
whole facet, because a small part of it is already contained in the pocket. But, again with a
threshold of 90%, if the population nds itself in a mixed equilibrium where both strategies
account for more than 10% of the equilibrium frequencies - and hence the equilibrium is not
contained in a corner pocket - we expect that most mutations will not take the population
outside the area it is in. On the facet itself we expect that on average the population will
also be pushed in the direction of its equilibrium composition.
With this way to classify population states, we can follow the population as it travels
from region to region. At any such transition, we can check if this transition can be
associated with a neutral mutant entering or exiting the population, or with advantageous
or disadvantageous mutants entering or exiting the population. This gives us the possibility
to characterize a sequence of transitions as an indirect invasion or an invasion of a di¤erent
kind. If strategy A is a pure equilibrium strategy, and B is a neutral mutant of A, and
C has a strict advantage against B, then - with obvious abbreviations - going from the
region A to AB to BA to B to BC will be classied as an indirect invasion. If A is a
pure equilibrium, and D is a mutant with a selective disadvantage, then going from region
A to region AD is classied as a di¤erent invasion. (On www.creedexperiment/evolution
we go into more detail on possible boundary crossings and possible sequences of boundary
crossings).
This immediately points out the trade-o¤ that we face for the choice of a threshold. If
we choose a threshold that is larger than N 1N , where N is the population size, then any
mutant entering the population will take it outside the corner pocket. All mutants will
therefore be recorded as transitions, and all disadvantageous mutants will be recorded as
di¤erent invasions, even though they might be extinct the next generation already. This
high threshold thereby leaves no room at all to observe what we are interested in, which is
17
the di¤erence in how selection acts on di¤erent (sequences of) mutants. On the other hand,
if we choose the threshold at 50%, then we leave no room to observe dynamics near mixed
equilibria at all, as described above. So a lower threshold means more room to observe
selection at work, but also more mixed equilibria that will go unnoticed, because they end
up in corner pockets.
4.3 Capturing indirect invasions
Theorems 5 and 6 concern stepping stone paths out of pure equilibria. Since the theorems
suggest that equilibria can be left through neutral mutants that open doors for other,
advantageous mutants, it makes sense to rst acknowledge that there will also be neutral
mutants that themselves still are equilibria, and that therefore do not yet open such doors.
As the starting point of a path out of a pure equilibrium, we therefore only choose those
equilibria that were not themselves reached by a neutral invasion. Thereby we allow for
neutral mutants that themselves are still equilibria just to be a part of the stepping stone
path. As expected, all such sequences of neutral mutants turn out to have the same self-play,
which, for as long as they are equilibria, is the equilibrium path. This implies that if we nd
a sequence of neutral mutants that themselves are equilibria, followed, rst, by a neutral
invasion to a state that is not an equilibrium, which in turn is followed by an advantageous
mutant, then it is reasonable to count the whole sequence as one single indirect invasion. It
is for sure a two-step indirect invasion when counted from the last equilibrium, and one can
very well also see it as an indirect invasion into the rst and into all equilibria in between,
but counting it as just one single indirect invasion is more than reasonable.
If a pure equilibrium is left through a sequence of one or more boundary crossings that
can be characterized as neutral, followed by one boundary crossing that can be characterized
as the entry of an advantageous mutant, then it is qualied as an indirect invasion. All
other sequences out of equilibrium (zero or more neutral mutants followed by a boundary
crossing that can be characterized as the entry of disadvantageous mutant) are qualied as
other invasions. Notice that theorems 5 and 6 concern leaving equilibria, and not what
happens after an equilibrium is left. What we are after here is therefore rst and foremost
to capture paths away from the equilibrium that occur in the simulations.
Finding those starting points (pure equilibria that are themselves not reached by a
neutral mutant) is facilitated by an automated procedure called the best responder. This
procedure can, for a single nite automaton, nd the best response to it, and thereby
determine if it is a best response to itself and hence a pure equilibrium (see Appendix C).
We ran simulations for di¤erent population sizes, and rst looked at how pure equilibria
are left. The data indicate that for pure equilibria the share of indirect invasions goes to 1
with an increase in population size (see Fig. 5).
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Figure 5. Transitions out of pure equilibria. As the population increases, the share of
transitions that are indirect invasions goes to one.
For combinations of two or more nite automata it is harder to get such clean data. Con-
structing a best responder to a mixture of strategies is far more complicated than construct-
ing one for pure strategies and thereby well beyond the scope of this paper. This implies
that we do not have an automated procedure that determines if mixed states are equilibria.
The best we can do without having this procedure at our disposal is to disregard as many
obvious mixed disequilibrium states as possible, and see how the remainder of the mixed
states - again, not themselves reached by a neutral invasion - is left. Here we of course
again set apart those that are left by indirect invasions, but in the remainder there is an
extra category. Since we expect that a mixed equilibrium might also be left relatively easily
by one of the composing strategies going extinct, we also count separately how many are
left by the population moving into a region of a lower dimension. We nd that for every
population size, the vast majority of mixed states consisting of 2 strategies are left by one
of the two xating. (The data and a more elaborate discussion are in the online material).
The simulations do not render enough data for states consisting of 3 pure strategies, as the
population spends most of its time in states with low dimensions.
To support the claim that the dynamics take a population from equilibrium to equi-
librium through indirect invasions, it is worthwhile to look at what happens after one
equilibrium is left, and how long it takes to get to another. Although not the main aim
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of the simulations - which focus on leaving equilibria, and not on arriving at others - it is
interesting to note that the percentage of time spent in equilibrium also increases with the
population size. With increasing population size, it gets a bit harder to pinpoint how much
time is spent in equilibrium; more time is spent outside of the corner pockets, for which
we do not have a mixed state best responder procedure. We can however give upper and
lower bounds, as Figure 6 does. Note that with small population sizes (the left side of Fig.
6) and xed per individual mutation rates, only few mutations occur. This implies that
by chance a population can get stuck in a disequilibrium state for a very long time, just
because the right mutation takes forever to appear.
Figure 6. Time spent in equilibrium as a function of population size.
Together, these ndings strongly suggest that populations playing repeated prisoners dilem-
mas do indeed walk from equilibrium to equilibrium through indirect invasions, already for
populations that are not even that large. The leaving of pure equilibria is shown to become
dominated completely by indirect invasions, while mixed states tend to be left by xation
events of the composing pure strategies more than through indirect invasions.
4.4 Comparison between equilibria that are not RAII with equi-
libria that are
Our claim is that it matters that equilibria in the repeated prisoners dilemma, although
neutrally stable (NSS), are not robust against indirect invasions (RAII). If we rank a few well
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known di¤erent equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory according to decreasing
levels of stability, then we get the following inclusions.
ESS  NSS  NE
A Nash equilibrium that is not NSS is easily left; not being NSS means that there is a
mutant for which the replicator dynamics pushes the population away from the equilibrium
if this mutant enters the population. An ESS on the other hand is very stable; there is a
neighbourhood such that the replicator dynamics take the population back to the ESS from
any point in that neighbourhood. Still, stability remains a relative thing; although it is much
harder to leave an ESS - it takes orders of magnitude more time in any reasonable stochastic
dynamic process - than it is to leave a Nash equilibrium that is not NSS, it is not impossible.
In fact, some of the most interesting papers in the literature on evolutionary game theory
compare the stability of di¤erent ESSes in one and the same game by comparing how
many (simultaneous) mutations it takes to get from one ESS to the other (see for instance
Kandori, Mailath & Rob, 1993, Kandori & Rob, 1995, Foster and Young, 1990, Young,
1993, 1998, Ellison, 2000). It may take very long, but the idea is that it could still be
that one equilibrium is left more easily than the other. This then gives rise to a further
renement (stochastic stability in Young, 1993, or long run equilibria in Kandori, Mailath
& Rob, 1993).
Our claim is that in order to properly compare stability, the categorization with ESS,
NSS and NE is in some cases a bit too rough. Some NSSes are, and some are not RAII.
Those that are RAII, we suggest, are much more stable than those that are not. Since being
RAII implies that this strategy is contained in a setwise generalisation of an ESS (see van
Veelen, 2010) one could even say that in the sequence of inclusions below, the bigger gap
is actually between RAII and NSS, and not between ESS and RAII.
ESS  RAII  NSS  NE
In order to indicate that it does indeed matter that NSSes in a repeated prisoners dilemma
are not RAII, we will compare it to a game that is rather similar in a lot of respects, but
that has equilibria that are in fact RAII. If we replace the prisoners dilemma as a stage
game with a coordination game, then we preserve everything, including the richness of the
strategy space. The only di¤erence is that now we do get equilibria that are RAII (but
not ESS). That means that what sets these repeated games apart is the existence resp.
nonexistence of the possibility for indirect invasions.
2 0
0 2
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Below we compare the number of transitions in simulations for the repeated prisoners
dilemma to the number of transitions in the repeated coordination game. What counts as
a transition is if the population goes to a state where the self-play is di¤erent.
Figure 7. The number of transitions leaving pure equilibria in a repeated prisoners
dilemma and in a repeated coordination game for di¤erent population sizes. Note that in
the repeated coordination game, all RAII equilibria are pure, and all mixed equilibria are
not NSS.
The number of transitions away from pure equilibria in the repeated prisoners dilemma is
decreasing only very slightly. This ts what we expect; with example 6 in Van Veelen (2010)
in mind, we expect that it is the xation probability of neutral mutants that determines
the speed at which indirect invasions occur in large populations. The xation probability of
a neutral mutant is 1N , where N is the population size, but since the mutation probability
per individual is constant, the number of neutral mutants entering is proportional to N .
If we can assume that every neutral mutant has either xated or gone extinct before the
other neutral mutant appears, then the expected number of transitions by neutral mutants
should be constant, as the decrease in xation probability is compensated by an increase
in numbers of neutral mutants entering. But with an increase in population size, xation
times also increase, and the larger the population, the more neutral mutants enter in a
population that has not yet xated. This interference implies that we will be seeing slightly
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less xation events for larger populations.
The number of transitions in the repeated coordination game on the other hand de-
creases much more drastically. The data suggest that the number of transitions out of
pure equilibria in the repeated coordination game divided by the number of transitions in
the repeated prisoners dilemma goes to 0 rather rapidly. One can therefore conclude that
evolution in a population playing the repeated prisoners dilemma remains innitely more
mobile than evolution in a population playing a repeated coordination game, and that the
possibility of indirect invasions makes all the di¤erence.
4.5 Average reciprocity and niceness
The appendix also contains ways to measure reciprocity and cooperativeness for strategies.
Not surprisingly, we nd that strategies are on average somewhat reciprocal and moderately
cooperative. This is rather natural; all equilibrium strategies are between uncooperative
and fully cooperative and between not reciprocal and very reciprocal. A process that takes
the population from equilibrium to equilibrium, with in- as well as decreasing levels of
cooperation therefore must lead to an average that is somewhat reciprocal and moderately
cooperative. Paths from one equilibrium to the other also typically rst exhibit an increase
(decrease) of the level of reciprocity, which is followed by an increase (decrease) of the level
of cooperation. Note that, although the measure for cooperativeness can by construction
not fall below 0 or be larger than 1, the measure for reciprocity can be negative.
There are however also equilibria where cooperation is preceded by a negative hand-
shake. If we look at the following automaton, then it constitutes an equilibrium where
cooperation that comes too soon is actually punished. We do sometimes see equilibria like
this arising in the population (see also Appendix D, that contains the sequence of strate-
gies that comes with the part of a run that is depicted in Fig. 3). Reciprocity here is not
unambiguously positive; this strategy rewards cooperation when in state 4 and 5, but it
does also punish cooperation when in state 1, 2 or 3 (see again the online tutorial for more
detailed description of measures of reciprocity).
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Figure 8. D3TFT . With this strategy, three Ds is the code for cooperation to start.
Once past the initial uncooperative fase, it plays just like ordinary TFT , but any
deviation from the initial uncooperative fase implies eternal defection.
5 Conclusion and discussion
Both the theorems and the simulations in this paper indicate that there is a fundamental
instability in repeated games, provided that the stage game is characterized by a conict
between individual and collective interests. The prime example is of course the repeated
prisoners dilemma. Theorems 8 and 9 show that with su¢ ciently large continuation prob-
ability , there is no strategy in the repeated prisoners dilemma that is robust against
indirect invasions. In other words: every equilibrium can be upset, either by a mutant, if
the strategy is not an NSS, or by a succession of mutants if the strategy is an NSS. The
simulations show that under very reasonable mutation schemes these stepping stone paths
out of equilibrium not only exist, but evolution also actually nds them.
The richness of the strategy space therefore excludes that there is an equilibrium rene-
ment, or a static stability concept, that by only looking at the game itself can predict what
happens in a population with random matching, mutation and selection. One important
thing that this tells us, is that what we can expect to evolve will essentially depend - besides
on  - on the structure of the mutation probabilities, or more precisely, on which mutations
are relatively likely. The proofs of the results show that there are stepping stone paths out
of equilibrium, both with in- and with decreasing levels of cooperation. Whether we can
expect cooperation to in- or decrease therefore depends on how many more of these paths
there are, and, more importantly, on the probabilities with which the di¤erent mutations
occur. Also the starting point might matter, although it seems that a natural starting point
for evolution is the strategy to always defect.
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If we allow ourselves to restrict the strategy space, then that o¤ers a possibility to
get stability results. It is however important too see that restricting the strategy space
to, say, a subset T of S, is in fact a special case of a combination of a starting point
(somewhere within T ) and an assumption concerning mutation probabilities (they are zero
for all mutations from elements of T to elements of SnT ). This therefore more or less falls
within the message that starting point and mutation probabilities are decisive. The results
here however also imply that any stability result that is achieved by restricting the strategy
space is not robust to relaxations of the restriction on the strategy space. If the strategies
needed for the indirect invasions are apparently barred by exclusion from the strategy space,
they nonetheless still exist, and adding them to the strategy space (i.e. allowing mutations
to them) would render the strategy that was stable within the restricted strategy set T
instable.
Simulations show that with a reasonable mutation process, a population that is not too
small does indeed walk from equilibrium to equilibrium through indirect invasions. Since
the innite population model is meant to produce results that help us understand what
happens in large, but still nite populations, the simulations thereby also emphasize the
importance of neutral mutants and the need to have a concept of robustness against indirect
invasions in our theory for innite populations.
Playing with the simulations is also seriously fun, and can be done at www.creedexperiment.nl/evolution.
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A A metric for S
Since a strategy S : H ! A is a function that maps the set of histories H on the action
space A, the set of strategies S is at least as large as the power set of H if the number of
actions in A is larger than 1. Since H is countably innite, we know from Cantors Theorem
that the power set of H is uncountably innite.
Let f : H  S  S !f0; 1g be dened by
f (ht; S; T ) =
(
0 if S (ht) = T (ht)
1 if S (ht) 6= T (ht)
We assume that the action space A is nite, and that it has k elements, a1; :::; ak. The
number of possible histories in Ht therefore is k2t 2.
Dene the distance between S and T , both S; T 2 S, as follows:
d (S; T ) =
1P
t=1
t
P
ht2Ht
jf (ht; S; T )j
with  = k2 and  2 (0; 1).
If we take for St  S the set of strategies in S that all play a1 for all histories hu with
u > t, then it is a nite set; it has k(
Pt
v=1 k
2t 2) = k

k2t 1
k2 1

elements. The set
1S
t=1
St is
therefore countable, but it is easy to see that it is dense in S.
B Proofs of theorems
B.1
Proof of Theorem 8 Assume that P is an equilibrium (if it is not, it it trivially not
robust against indirect invasions). Let P1; :::; Pn 2 S be the composing pure strategies of
P and let p1; :::; pn;
Pn
i=1 pi = 1, be the probabilities with which they are played in P . If
(P; P ) > (D;D), then obviously not all combinations of Pi and Pj , with 1  i; j  n,
can always play D when they interact. So there must be at least one i and one j, with
1  i; j  n, and a time  for which aPi;Pj 6= (D;D). First it is clear that there cannot
only be a nite number of times that C is played in the mixture. Suppose that were true,
and there is a time  and an i and a j, with 1  i; j  n, for which aPi;Pj 6= (D;D) and
a
Pi;Pj
t = (D;D) for all i and j and t >  , then the mixture is not an equilibrium; without
restricting generality we can assume that Pi

h
Pi;Pj


= C and then a strategy that equals
Pi for all histories at times t <  and plays D for all histories at times t   earns a higher
payo¤ than Pi and therefore also higher than all other composing strategies. Hence C must
be played innitely many times in the mixed population. Since there is only a nite number
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of combinations (Pi; Pj), it also follows that there is at least one in which Pi plays C an
innite number of times.
Let (Pi; Pj) be a combination of strategies in which Pi plays C innitely often. Let
E (i; j) be the set of combinations of strategies (Pk; Pl) for which a
Pk;Pl
t = a
Pi;Pj
t 8 t, that
is, strategies Pk and Pl that follow the same path as when Pi interacts with Pj . Given
that P is a nite mixture, there is a nite time  0 which is su¢ ciently large to determine
whether or not (Pk; Pl) 2 E (i; j), that is, there is a  0 such that if aPk;Plt = aPi;Pjt 8 t   0
then aPk;Plt = a
Pi;Pj
t 8 t. Let  00 >  0 be the rst time t after  0 at which aPi;Pjt;1 = C.
Let Ei (j) be the set of strategies Pl such that (Pi; Pl) 2 E (i; j). For all Pl 2 Ei (j) one
can dene Ql as the pure strategy that equals Pl for all histories, except for those in the setbH = nht j t >  00; au = aPj ;Piu for u   0 and a 00;2 = Do. These histories only occur o¤ all
equilibrium paths, since the history up to and including  0 implies that this history does not
occur along an equilibrium path outside E (i; j), as experienced by j, while the remainder
implies that it does not occur along equilibrium paths in E (i; j). For the histories ht 2 bH
we take Ql (ht) = a
Pj ;Pi
t = Pl

h
Pj ;Pi
t

. Obviously, the path of Ql against Pm is the same
as the path of Pl against Pm for all m, 1  m  n and all Pl 2 Ei (j). Dene Q as the
strategy that plays Ql with probability pl for Pl 2 Ei (j) and Pl with probability pl for all
Pl =2 Ei (j). For this strategy we have that (Q;P ) =  (P; P ) =  (Q;Q) =  (P;Q) :
Let R be the strategy that equals Pi, except for h
Pi;Pj
 00 , for which we take R

h
Pi;Pj
 00

= D
and except for histories that are elements of the set eH = nht j t >  00; au = aPi;Pju for u   0 and a 00;1 = D o,
for which we take R (ht) = Pi

h
Pi;Pj
t

; ht 2 eH.
Because P is an equilibrium, it must be that (R;P )  (P; P ). It is also clear that
(R;Q) > (Q;Q) =  (P;Q), because R improves itself against strategies Ql 2 Ei (j) at
time  00 without being punished and remains unchanged against strategies that are not in
Ei (j). As (R;Q) > (Q;Q), while (P; P ) =  (Q;P ) and (P;Q) =  (Q;Q), P is
not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Note that if Ql = Pl 8 Pl 2 Ei (j), that would contradict P being an equilibrium,
because if P = Q then (R;Q) > (Q;Q) would contradict that (R;P )  (P; P ).
B.2
Proof of Theorem 9 Assume that P is an equilibrium (if it is not, it it trivially not
robust against indirect invasions). Take i; j and  such that ij; = mink;l;t kl;t. For all
Pl 2 Ei (j) one can dene Ql as the pure strategy that equals Pl for all histories, except for
those that are elements of the set bH = fht j t > ; au;2 = C; u  g. These histories only
occur o¤ all equilibrium paths; the assumption implies that ij; < 1 and hence it is not
possible that aPl;Pi;2 = C, for that would make 1
 
aPi;Pl
 1  C; aPi;Pl  = 0 8 Pl 2 Ei (j) .
For those histories ht 2 bH we take Ql (ht) = C. Obviously, the path of Ql against Pm
is the same as the path of Pl against Pm for all m, 1  m  n and all Pl 2 Ei (j) .
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Dene Q as the strategy that plays Ql with probability pl for Pl 2 Ei (j) and Pl with
probability pl for all Pl =2 Ei (j). Consequently the corresponding payo¤s are also equal;
(Q;P ) =  (P; P ) =  (Q;Q) =  (P;Q).
Now let R be the strategy that equals Pi, except for the history h
Pi;Pj
 , for which we
choose R

h
Pi;Pj


= C and except for the histories that are elements of the set eH =n
ht j t > ; au = aPi;Pju for u <  , a;1 = C and au;2 = C; u > 
o
, for which we also take
R (ht) = C; ht 2 eH.
Because P is an equilibrium, it must be that (R;P )  (P; P ). It is also clear that
(R;Q) > (Q;Q) =  (P;Q), because R improves itself against strategies Ql 2 Ei (j) at
time  00 without being punished and remains unchanged against strategies that are not in
Ei (j) . As (R;Q) > (Q;Q), while (P; P ) =  (Q;P ) and (P;Q) =  (Q;Q), P is
not weakly robust against indirect invasions.
Note again that if Ql = Pl 8 Pl 2 Ei (j) , that would contradict P being an equilibrium,
because if P = Q then (R;Q) > (Q;Q) would contradict that (R;P )  (P; P ).
C The best responder
In order to be able to determine if a nite automaton - and hence a pure strategy - is a Nash
equilibrium, we have constructed a small routine in the program called the best responder.
This routine nds the payo¤ of the best response against strategy S, as well as a best
response. If the payo¤ of S against itself equals this payo¤, then S is a Nash equilibrium.
This is a useful device, since the innity of the strategy space does not allow us to simply
compare the payo¤ of S against itself to the payo¤ of all other strategies against S one
after the other.
Suppose strategy S is an automaton with K states. Any state k is characterized by an
action played by S when it nds itself in this state, and a list of transitions as a function of
the action played by the opponent of S. With a slightly abusive notation - S is a function
of histories elsewhere, while here it is easier to make it a function of states - we will write
the rst as S : f1; :::;Kg ! A and the latter as tk : A! f1; :::;Kg, k = 1; :::;K.
The value of being in state k is denoted by V (k). We aim to nd a solution to the
following system:
V (k) = max
a2A
f1 (a; S (k)) + V (tk (a))g k = 1; :::;K
Let V  (k) ; k = 1; :::;K be the solution to this system. The discounted value in the initial
state, (1  )V  (1), is the maximal discounted payo¤ to be earned against S, and ak =
argmaxa2A f1 (a; S (k)) + V  (tk (a))g gives the optimal action when S is in state k.
The best responder does the following iteration.
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Initialisation step:
V1 (k) = 0; k = 1; :::;K
Iteration step:
Vn+1 (k) = max
a2A
f1 (a; S (k)) + Vn (tk (a))g k = 1; :::;K
It is quite straightforward that this iteration converges, as is shown in the following simple
lemma. We will assume that the initialisation makes sure that we begin with values for all
states that are below the solution of the system (whenever this procedure is invoked, we
make sure that is in fact the case) but that is not actually necessary for convergence.
Lemma 10 If V1 (k)  V  (k) for all k and if  2 [0; 1) then the above iteration converges
to V  (k) ; k = 1; :::;K.
Proof. First, if Vn (k)  V  (k) for all k, then also
Vn+1 (k) = max
a2A
f1 (a; S (k)) + Vn (tk (a))g
 max
a2A
f1 (a; S (k)) + V  (tk (a))g = V  (k) for all k.
Hence V  (k)  Vn (k)  0 for all states k and all iterations n.
By denition we also have
Vn+1 (k)  1 (ak; S (k)) + Vn (tk (ak)) for all k.
Therefore
0  V  (k)  Vn+1 (k)   (V  (tk (ak))  Vn (tk (ak))) for all k.
This implies that
0  max
k
(V  (k)  Vn+1 (k))  max (V  (k)  Vn (k))
and since  < 0 we nd that limn!1 (V  (k)  Vn (k)) = 0 for all k.
The best responder gives us both the maximum payo¤ (1  )V  (1) when playing against
S, and an optimal strategy when playing against S, as ak prescribes what to play when S
is in state k. For numerical reasons, we actually use the latter. It is important for us to
determine whether or not the payo¤ of S against itself is exactly equal to the maximum
payo¤when playing against S. The iteration with which the best responder nds the latter
can have a numerical inaccuracy in it, and the evaluating the payo¤ of two given strategies
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against each other (here: S against S) can too. These are however di¤erent inaccuracies, so
in order to have the same inaccuracies in both, we use the strategy that the best responder
gives, rst let it play that against S, then let S play against itself, and compare the two
payo¤s. If they are equal, then S is a best response to itself.
Note that the computer program works with phenotypes, not with genotypes, so two
di¤erent ways to encode for instance the strategy AllD will be treated as one and the same
strategy.
D A typical sequence of strategies
The relevant payo¤s for the sequence of strategies that go with the transitions indicated in
Fig. 3 are given below. The population starts at All D. The rst indirect invasion (a neutral
mutant followed by a mutant with a selective advantage) brings the population to a mixture
of the two mutants. This mixture is an equilibrium when the strategy is restricted to these
two strategies, but not for the unrestricted strategy space; the mixture is outperformed
by a third mutant that appears at marker C. This mutant #3 dominates mutant #2, and
once #2 has disappeared, it dominates mutant #1, and goes to xation. This establishes
full cooperation. After this we get an indirect invasion back to All D, and nally we get
an indirect invasion that establishes a strategy that, when played against itself, starts with
defection, and then plays cooperate ever after.
1 1 4
1 1 347 2
2
7
0 1 27 3 3
1 57 3 3 3
3
4
3 3 0
1 34 4 1 1 1
6
7
1 1 1 109175
4
7 1
12
35 2
1
2
The actual automata are on the next page.
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E Measures of cooperativeness and reciprocity3
There are two reasons why we would like to have measures for cooperativeness and reci-
procity. The rst and most important reason is obvious; we would simply like to know
how cooperative, and how reciprocal, strategies are. The second reason is that these mea-
sures may serve as an indication of indirect invasions. Typically an indirect invasion is
characterized by a change in reciprocity followed by a change in cooperativeness.
Any measure of cooperativeness will have to weigh the di¤erent histories, and as we will
see, every choice how to weigh them has appealing properties and drawbacks. In contrast to
earlier denitions, here it is more natural to look at histories that only reect what actions
the other player has played. This captures all relevant histories for the measurement of
cooperativeness, because what a strategy S itself has played is uniquely determined by the
history of actions by the other player.
h1 = ()
ht = (a1;2; :::; at 1;2) ; t = 2; 3; :::
Again, we will sometimes also write
 
ht; at;2

for a history ht+1, and we get the following
sets of possible histories at time t
H1 =

h1
	
Ht =
Qt 1
i=1 A t = 2; 3; :::
With the repeated prisonners dilemma we have A = fC;Dg, so in that case there are 2t 1
histories ht 2 Ht
We begin with a measure that tells us how cooperative a strategy is, given that it is
facing a history ht. If we weigh a history at time t+ s with the probability that the game
actually reaches round t + s   1, given that it has already reached round t   1, and if we
also divide by the number of di¤erent histories of length t+s 1, under the restriction that
the rst t  1 rounds of these histories are given by ht, we get the following. Note that this
measure does not depend on the environment a strategy is in.
C
 
S; ht

= (1  )
1X
s=0
 

2
s
0BBBB@
X
h2Ht+s
h
i
=h
i
t;i=1;:::;t 1
1fS(h)=Cg
1CCCCA
The overall cooperativeness of a strategy S can then be dened as the cooperativeness at
the beginning, where we have the empty history; C (S) = C
 
S; h1

.
3This is meant to only appear on www.creedexperiment.nl/evolution, where one can run simulations
and measure cooperativeness and reciprocity of the evolving population
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Always Cooperate Always defect Condition on rst move
Tit for Tat Tat for Tit Tit for Two Tats
Grim Trigger DTFT / Negative handshake Win-stay, lose-shift
An intuition for what this measure does can be gained from the above gure. The top bar
represents the empty history. The second bar represents histories of length 1, and is split in
two; the history where the other has cooperated, and the one where the other has defected.
The third bar represents histories of lenth 2, and is split in four; the histories CC, CD, DC
and DD. This continues indenitely, but for the pictures we restrict ourselves to histories
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of length 5 or less. If a part is blue, then that means that the strategy reacts to this history
with cooperation, if it is red, then the strategy reacts with defection. Cooperativeness
weighs the blueness of those pictures.
It is obvious that C (AllC) = 1 and that C (AllD) = 0. A strategy that starts with
cooperation, and further conditions play on the rst move entirely has cooperativeness
1  2 . This is sensible; if  = 0, then the rst move is the only move, and since this strategy
cooperates on the rst move, it should have cooperativeness measure 1. On the other hand,
except for the rst move, this strategy cooperates in exactly half of the histories of length
t for all t > 1. Therefore it makes sense that if  goes to 1, then cooperativeness goes to 12 .
More simple computations shows that C (TitForTat) = 1  2 , C (TatForT it) = 2 and
C (TitForTwoTats) = 34 +
1 2
4 . The last simple computation shows that C (GRIM) =
2 2
2  , which is 1 at  = 0 for similar reasons, and goes to 0 if  goes to 1.
4
A measure for reciprocity can be constructed by comparing how much the cooperativeness
of strategy S is changed if its opponent plays D rather than C. Again, histories of the same
length are weighted equally here.
R (S) =
1X
t=1
X
h2Ht
 

2
t 1 
C
 
S;
 
h;C
  C  S;  h;D
In the gure above, this is visualized as the di¤erence in blueness below two neighbouring
bits that share their history up to the one before last period.
Simple calculations now give that R (AllC) = R (AllD) = 0 and R (TFT ) = 1. Also,
if we look at a strategy that only conditions on the rst move and that defects forever if
the rst move of the other was D, and cooperates forever if the rst move of the other was
C, this strategy also has reciprocity 1. It is not hard to see that  1 and +1 are in fact
the lower and upper bounds for reciprocity with this equal weighing of all strategies of the
same length. Also R (GRIM) = 4(1 )
(2 )2 . Note that here the reciprocity of Grim Trigger is
lower than that of TFT , which is due to the fact that for many histories GRIM will only
play a sequence of Ds either way.5
Alternatively we could measure the cooperativeness and reciprocity of a strategy given
the population it is in. In that case, we should not weight all histories of a given length
equally, but in the proportions in which they do occur given the actual population of
4C (TFT ) = (1  )
 
1 +
1X
t=1
1
2
t
!
= 1
2
(1  ) + 1
2
C (GRIM) = (1  )
1X
t=0
 
1
2

t
= (1  ) 1
1  
2
= 2 2
2 
5R (TFT ) =
1X
t=1
X

2
t 1 
1
2
+ 1
2
(1  )    1
2
  1
2
(1  ) 2t 1 = 1X
t=1
t 1 (1  ) = 1
R (GRIM) =
1X
t=1


2
t 1 h
2 2
2    0
i
=
4(1 )
(2 )2
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strategies. Hence the weight
 
1
2
t 1
, which is one divided by the number of strategies in
Ht, will then be replaced by their actual proportions. For instance, in a population that
consists of any mixture of AllC, TFT and GRIM , the only history at time t that occurs, is
a sequences of t 1 consecutive Cs. The measure for cooperativeness then simply becomes
the expected times a strategy plays C divided by the expected number of rounds.
Suppose the population is given by a vector of frequencies x = [x1; :::; xN ] where xi is
the frequency of strategy Si. Then we dene the population-dependent cooperativeness of
a strategy S as follows:
Cx (S) = (1  )
1X
t=1
t 1
 
NX
i=1
xi1nShS;Sit =Co
!
In the population with only AllC, TFT and GRIM , cooperativeness of all these three
strategies is 1. In an innitely large population of  TFT and 1  AllD, cooperativeness
of TFT is 1   + .
A reasonable way of measuring reciprocity is to compare actual histories with histories that
would have unfolded after one-step deviations. So let hS;Tt;a;s be the history that for the rst
t  1 steps unfolds recurcively between strategy S and T - as above;
hS;T1 = ()
and the recursion step
aS;Ti =

S

hS;Ti

; T

hS;T i

hS;Ti+1 =

hi; a
S;T
i

; i = 1; 2; :::; t  1.
Only at time t the opponent plays a, while strategy S does not deviate and plays S

hS;Tt

;
aS;Tt =

S

hS;Tt

; a

hS;Tt+1 =

hi; a
S;T
t

.
After that we go back to the normal recursion step
aS;Ti =

S

hS;Ti

; T

hS;T i

hS;Ti+1 =

hi; a
S;T
i

; i = t+ 1; :::t+ s
If T

hS;T i

= a, then this is hS;Tt;a;s is just the actual history h
S;T
t+1+s, but if T

hS;T i

6= a,
it is a counterfactual history after a one-step deviation. The history h
S;T
t;a;s, as above, just
gives the actions of player T and ignores those of player S.
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With this denition, we can make a measure for reciprocity as follows:
Rx (S) = (1  )2
1X
t=1
t 1
NX
i=1
xi
1X
s=0
s

1n
S

h
S;Si
t;C;s

=C
o   1n
S

h
S;Si
t;D;s

=C
o
In a population of GRIM only, it is relatively easy to see that the reciprocity of GRIM
is 1; the path of play between GRIM and itself is just a sequence of Cs, while after a
deviation GRIM just plays a sequence of Ds. So at any time t, the discounted di¤erence
between these sequence from then on, normalised by multiplying by one of the (1  )s, is
1. So discounting over t and normalizing by the other (1  ) gives a reciprocity measure
of 1.
In a population of TFT only, the reciprocity of TFT is 11+ . Again, the path of play
between TFT and itself is a sequence of Cs, but now, on the path after any deviation,
TFT plays a sequence of alternating Ds and Cs. So at any time t, the discounted and
normalized di¤erence between them is (1  )

1
1    1 2

= 11+ . So discounting over t
and normalizing by the other (1  ) gives the same number.
This comparison is in line with what we might want from a reciprocity measure that
depends on the actual population; at any stage, the threat that grim trigger poses to itself
is maximal, and larger than the threat TFT poses to itself.
Another comparison shows that this measure also picks up the fact that, if the pun-
ishment in Grim Trigger is in fact triggered on the path of play, then on the remainder of
the path, GRIM is actually not reciprocal at all anymore. With TFT on the other hand,
reciprocity actually remains the same, whether the punishment has been triggered in the
past or not. This is reected in the following example.
In a population of  TitForTat and (1  ) TatForT it, the reciprocity of TitForTat is
 11+ +(1  ) 11+ = 11+ ; the reciprocity of TitForTat against itself was computed above,
and for the computation of TitForTat against TatForT it it is enough to realize that the
comparison between actual and counterfactual is between DCDC::: versus CCCC::: at odd
ts and between CDCD::: versus DDDD::: at even ts.
In a population of  GRIM and 1    TatForT it, the reciprocity of GRIM is  +
(1  ) (1  ) = 1    + ; in the latter interaction, GRIM only alters its behaviour
in response to a change at t = 1. So for not too large  - implying that there is enough
TatForT it to have a noticeable e¤ect of the punishment being triggered - and not too small
, GRIM now is actually less reciprocal than TitForTat.
Dependence on the population a strategy nds itself in can be seen as a good or a bad
thing. For picking up indirect invasions, it seems to be a good thing; changes far o¤
the current path of play between strategies do not change this reciprocity measure; it only
changes if a strategy mutates into one that reacts di¤erently to a one-step deviation. This
implies that only becoming more or becoming less reciprocal in the way that is relevant
for indirect invasions is picked up. On the other hand, it does not lend itself for a general,
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environment-independent statement of how reciprocal or cooperative a strategy is.
Another possibility is to only look at the actions directly after a one-step deviation. Then
we would get
Rx (S) = (1  )
1X
t=1
t 1
NX
i=1
xi

1n
S

h
S;Si
t ;C

=C
o   1n
S

h
S;Si
t ;D

=C
o
Here the reciprocity of AllC is 0 again. The reciprocity of both TFT and GRIM in a
population of TFT , GRIM and AllC is 1 here.
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